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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the economic effects of agricultural price and merchandise trade 
policies around the world as of 2004 on global markets, net farm incomes, and national 
and regional economic welfare and poverty, using the global economy wide Linkage 
Model, new estimates of agricultural price distortions for developing countries, and a 
poverty elasticities approach. It addresses two questions: To what extent are policies as of 
2004 still reducing rewards from farming in developing countries and thereby adding to 
inequality across countries in farm household incomes? Are they depressing value added 
more in primary agriculture than in the rest of the economy of developing countries, and 
earnings of unskilled workers more than of owners of other factors of production, thereby 
potentially contributing to inequality and poverty within developing countries (given that 
farm incomes are well below non-farm incomes in most developing countries and that 
agriculture there is intensive in the use of unskilled labor)? Results are presented for the 
key countries and regions of the world and for the world as a whole. They reveal that, by 
moving to free markets, income inequality between countries would be reduced at least 
slightly, all but one-sixth of the gains to developing countries would come from 
agricultural policy reform, unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of 
whom work on farms – would benefit most from reform, net farm incomes in developing 
countries would rise by 6 percent compared with 2 percent for non-agricultural value 
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Despite much reform over the past quarter of a century in policy distortions to agricultural 
incentives, many intervention measures remain (Anderson 2009). A question of great interest to 
the agricultural, trade, and development policy communities in many developing countries and 
international agencies is: How do those policies affect economic welfare, inequality and poverty 
levels? More specifically, for any developing country of interest, how important are its own 
policies as compared with those of the rest of the world in affecting the welfare of the poor in 
that country; and, given that three-quarters of the world’s poor depend on agriculture directly or 
indirectly for their livelihood (World Bank 2008), and an earlier finding that farm policies as of 
2001 were responsible for more than three-fifths of the global welfare cost of trade distortions 
(Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006), what contributions do agricultural policies 
in particular contribute to those outcomes? 
  Now is an appropriate time to address this set of questions for at least three reasons. One 
is that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is struggling to conclude the Doha round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, and agricultural policy reform is once again one of the most 
contentious issues in those talks. Another is that poorer countries and their development partners 
are striving to achieve their United Nations–encouraged Millennium Development Goals by 
2015, the prime ones being the alleviation of hunger and poverty. And third, a new set of 
estimates of distortions to agricultural incentives in many countries has been brought together 
recently by the World Bank (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008), and those estimates in turn have 
been expressed as an alternative set of price distortions for using in CGE models (Valenzuela 
and Anderson 2008). This latter set differs from the usual ones used by trade modelers in that it 
   2
is based on direct domestic-to-border price comparisons rather than (as with the GTAP dataset, 
see Badri Narayanan and Walmsley 2008) on just applied rates of import tariffs. 
 This chapter serves two purposes. The first is to analyze the economic effects of 
agricultural price and merchandise trade policies around the world as of 2004 on global markets, 
net farm incomes, and national and regional economic welfare and poverty. That is, it assesses 
how far the world still has to go in removing the disarray in world agriculture (to use the title of 
the seminal study by Johnson 1991), and to at least provide a crude indication of the poverty that 
could be alleviated by such a reform. In doing so this chapter also serves a second purpose, 
which is to explain the origin of the exogenous shocks used in the global modeling of the 
following chapter and in the national modeling studies in part II to IV of this volume to represent 
the market effects on particular developing countries of rest-of-world agricultural and trade 
policies. 
To quantify the impacts of current policies, we first amend the distortions in Version 7 of 
the GTAP global protection database (Badri Narayanan and Walmsley 2008) by replacing its 
applied tariffs with distortion rates that reproduce those estimated by authors of the developing 
country case studies in the World Bank’s recent Agricultural Distortion research project as 
collated by Valenzuela and Anderson (2008).
1 Those distortion estimates suggest that, despite 
reforms of the past 25 years, there was still a considerable range of rates across commodities and 
countries in 2004, including a strong anti-trade bias in national agricultural and trade policies for 
many developing countries. Furthermore, non-agricultural protectionism is still rife in some 
developing countries, and agricultural price supports in some high-income countries remain high. 
The present analysis addresses the following two questions: To what extent are policies 
as of 2004 still reducing rewards from farming in developing countries and thereby adding to 
inequality across countries in farm household incomes? Are they depressing value added more in 
primary agriculture than in the rest of the economy of developing countries, and earnings of 
unskilled workers more than of owners of other factors of production, thereby potentially 
contributing to inequality and poverty within those developing countries (given that farm 
incomes are well below non-farm incomes in most developing countries and that agriculture 
there is intensive in the use of unskilled labor)?  
                                                 
1   That distortions database is documented fully in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and is based on the 
methodology summarized in Anderson et al. (2008a and 2008b).    3
To provide answers to these and related questions, we use our amended GTAP distortion 
database in a global computable general equilibrium model (the LINKAGE model, see van der 
Mensbrugghe 2005) to assess how agricultural markets, factor prices and value added in 
agriculture versus non-farm sectors would differ if all price and trade policies that distort markets 
for farm and non-farm goods as of 2004 were removed. It is important to include nonagricultural 
trade policies in the reform experiment because, as shown in the new study reported in Anderson 
(2009), in many developing countries they may be more harmful in depressing farmer incentives 
then those countries’ agricultural policies. 
Results are presented for the key countries and regions of the world and for the world as a 
whole. While no-one anticipates a move to completely free markets globally in the near future, 
this prospective analysis serves as a benchmark to suggest what is at stake in terms of further 
reforms via WTO rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time, by showing how 
different the trade patterns of various countries would be without distortions, it also provides a 
better indication of agricultural comparative advantages in different parts of the world than is 
available by looking at actual trade and self-sufficiency indicators in the current distortion-ridden 
situation.  
The chapter begins with an examination of the extent of price distortions in 2004 
provided by various policy instruments as calibrated in Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), the 
emphasis being mainly on import tariffs in the case of non-farm products but, in the case of 
agriculture, the full range of production, consumption and trade taxes and subsidies. This is 
followed by a description of the LINKAGE model of the global economy to be used to analyze the 
consequences of removing those distortions. The key results of the two simulations are then 
presented: full global liberalization of markets for all merchandise, and – so as to see the relative 
contribution of farm policies to those outcomes – full global reform of just agricultural policies.
2 
The chapter concludes by highlighting the main messages that emerge from the results. They are 
that, by moving to free markets, income inequality between countries would be reduced at least 
slightly, all but one-sixth of the gains to developing countries would come from agricultural 
policy reform, unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of whom work on farms 
                                                 
2   Some of the questions raised here were addressed by Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) who 
use the same Linkage model as in the present analysis, and by Anderson and Valenzuela (2007a) using the 
GTAP-AGR model, but in each case those authors relied on the GTAP Version 6 protection database for 2001 
that included only applied import tariffs for developing countries).    4
– would benefit most from reform, net farm incomes in developing countries would rise by 6 
percent compared with 2 percent for non-agricultural value added, and the number of people 
surviving on less than US$1 a day would drop by 3 percent globally. 
 
 
Key Distortions in Global Markets 
 
 
Border measures traditionally have been the main means by which governments distort prices in 
their domestic markets for tradable products, with the relative prices of the various goods being 
affected by trade taxes or subsidies. Product-specific domestic output or farm input subsidies 
have played a more limited role, in part because of their much greater overt cost to the treasury.
3 
To quantify the impacts current policies, we use the Altertax procedure (Malcolm 1998) 
to amend the distortions in the pre-release of Version 7 of the GTAP global protection database. 
The amendments are mainly for developing countries but, following Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2007b), we also alter cotton distortions in the United States to better reflect policies there. To 
simplify the discussion below, European transition economies (in which we include Turkey) are 
treated as one of the world’s developing country regions, the others being Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America.
4  
Version 7 of the GTAP database includes estimates of bilateral tariffs and export 
subsidies and of domestic supports as of 2004 for more than 100 countries and country groups 
spanning the world. As with Version 6 of the GTAP dataset (which relates to 2001, see 
Dimaranan 2007), the protection data come from a joint CEPII (Paris)/ITC (Geneva) project 
known as MAcMaps. MAcMaps is a detailed database on bilateral import protection at the HS6 
tariff line level that integrates trade preferences, specific and compound tariffs and a partial 
                                                 
3   In principle services trade and foreign investment distortions also could distort incentives in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors, but they are ignored here because much controversy still surrounds their measurement and 
how they should be modeled. This is reflected in the results emerging from attempts to include services 
distortions in trade reform modeling, which have led to widely differing results. Compare, for example, Brown, 
Deardorff and Stern (2003), Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2005), and Hertel and Keeney (2006). 
4   We have no new distortion estimates for countries in the Middle East, so in what follows little attention is given 
to this small and relatively affluent part of the global agricultural economy.   5
evaluation of non-tariff barriers such as tariff rate quotas (TRQs).
5 The new Version 7 GTAP 
database for 2004 has lower tariffs than the previous Version 6 database for 2001, because of 
major reforms such as completing the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements and 
unilateral reforms including those resulting from WTO accession negotiations by China and 
other recent acceding countries. 
As mentioned above, the agricultural price distortion rates in that database have been 
replaced with an alternative set for numerous developing countries, based on nominal rate of 
assistance estimates for 2004 in Valenzuela and Anderson (2008). The sectoral averages of these 
amended values are shown in table 1. In the case of amendments to the import tariffs on 
individual farm products for any particular developing country, the bilateral tariff structure in the 
GTAP Version 7 database is preserved by simply lowering or raising the bilateral tariffs by the 
same proportion we amend the country’s average import tariff on each product for 2004.  
According to this amended dataset, the weighted average applied tariff for agriculture and 
lightly processed food in 2004 was 21.8 percent for developing countries and 22.3 percent for 
high-income countries, while for non-farm goods it was 7.5 percent for developing countries and 
just 1.2 percent for high-income countries. Export subsidies for farm products for a few high-
income regions, and export taxes in a few developing countries, were still in place in 2004, but 
they are generally small in their impact compared with tariffs, as are production subsidies and 
taxes.
6  
The averages on their own are not necessarily good indicators of overall distortions to 
farmers’ incentives. Also of importance is the composition of each country’s trade. Two 
examples serve to illustrate the point. First, if high-income countries’ tariffs on temperate farm 
products are at a near-prohibitive level but are zero on tropical products such as coffee beans, 
those countries’ import-weighted average agricultural tariff could be quite low even though 
agricultural value added in those rich countries had been enhanced substantially. A second 
illustration is where the non-agricultural primary sector receives a similar level of import 
protection as the farm sector and less than the manufacturing sector, but is much more export-
                                                 
5   More information on the MAcMaps database is available in Bouët et al. (2008) and at 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/macmap.htm. For details of its incorporation into the GTAP Version 7 
dataset, see Badri Narayanan and Walmsley (2008).  
6   Using the GTAP Version 6 database for 2001, Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006) found that agricultural 
production and export subsidies together contributed just 7 percent of the global welfare cost of agricultural 
protection.   6
focused than agriculture: trade reform may cause that other primary sector to expand at the 
expense not only of manufacturing but also of farming. Even though we have used production 
rather than trade weights to get sectoral averages rates of distortion in table 1, and even though 
the ratio of agricultural to other goods’ tariffs for 2004 in that table is well above unity for many 
of the regions shown, it is not possible to say from those distortion rates alone whether 
developing country policies have an anti-agricultural bias. Equally, it is not possible to know 
how the benefits of removal of agricultural tariffs in the protective countries would be distributed 
among the various agricultural-exporting countries. What is needed to address such issues is a 
global general equilibrium model to estimate the net effects of all sectors’ distortions in all 




The LINKAGE Model of the Global Economy 
 
 
The model used for this analysis is the World Bank’s global computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model, known as LINKAGE (van der Mensbrugghe 2005). For most of this decade it has 
formed the basis for the World Bank’s standard long-term projections of the world economy and 
for much of its trade (and more recently migration) policy analysis (e.g., World Bank 2002, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). It is a relatively straightforward CGE model but with some 
characteristics that distinguish it from other comparative static models such as the GTAP model 
(described in Hertel 1997). Factor stocks are fixed, which means in the case of labor that the 
extent of unemployment (if any) in the baseline remains unchanged. Producers minimize costs 
subject to constant returns to scale production technology, consumers maximize utility, and all 
markets – including for labor – are cleared with flexible prices. There are three types of 
production structures. Crop sectors reflect the substitution possibilities between extensive and 
intensive farming; livestock sectors reflect the substitution possibilities between pasture and 
intensive feeding; and all other sectors reflect standard capital/labor substitution. There are two 
types of labor, skilled and unskilled, and the total employment of each is assumed fixed (so no 
change in their unemployment levels) but both are assumed to be intersectorally mobile. There is   7
a single representative household per modeled region, allocating income to consumption using 
the extended linear expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure in 
which aggregate import demand is the outcome of allocating domestic absorption between 
domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is allocated across 
source countries to determine the bilateral trade flows.
7 
Government fiscal balances are fixed in US dollar terms, with the fiscal objective being 
met by changing the level of lump sum taxes on households. This implies that losses of tariff 
revenues are replaced by higher direct taxes on households. The current account balance also is 
fixed. Given that other external financial flows are fixed, this implies that ex ante changes to the 
trade balance are reflected in ex post changes to the real exchange rate. For example, if import 
tariffs are reduced, the propensity to import increases and additional imports are financed by 
increasing export revenues. The latter typically is achieved by a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Finally, investment is driven by savings. With fixed public and foreign saving, 
investment comes from changes in the savings behavior of households and from changes in the 
unit cost of investment. The model only solves for relative prices, with the numéraire, or price 
anchor, being the export price index of manufactured exports from high-income countries. This 
price is fixed at unity in the base year. 
A virtue of beginning with the latest GTAP database is that it includes bilateral tariffs 
that capture not only reciprocal but also non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements, the latter 
providing low-income exporters duty-free access to protected high-income country markets. This 
allows us to take into account the fact that future reform may cause a decline in the international 
terms of trade for those developing countries that are enjoying preferential access to agricultural 
and other markets of high-income countries (in addition to those that are net food importers 
because their comparative advantage is in other sectors such as labor-intensive manufacturing). 
The version of the LINKAGE model used for this study is based on an aggregation 
involving 23 sectors and 49 individual countries plus 11 country groups spanning the world (see 
van der Mensbrugghe, Valenzuela and Anderson 2009). There is an emphasis on agriculture and 
                                                 
7   The size of the Armington elasticities matters, see Valenzuela, Anderson and Hertel (2008) and Zhang (2009). 
The Linkage model assumes larger values than some other models because it is seeking to estimate long-run 
consequences of liberalization. An example of the difference this can make to the results is detailed in Anderson 
and Martin (2006, table 12A.2).    8
food, which comprise 16 of those 23 sectors. Note that, consistent with the WTO, we include 
Korea and Taiwan in the ‘developing country’ category.
8 
The results below are comparative static results, so they do not include the (often much 
larger) dynamic gains that result from an acceleration in investment due to the reduction in tariffs 
on industrial goods lowering the cost of investment. Also missing, therefore, are any costs of 
adjustment to reform. And because this version of the Linkage Model assumes perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale, it captures none of the benefits of freeing markets that 
could come from accelerated productivity growth, scale economies, and the creation of new 
markets (extensification vs. intensification). There is also a dampening effect on estimates of 
welfare gains because of product and regional aggregation, which hides many of the differences 
across products in rates of distortions. The results therefore should be treated as providing very 




Prospective Effects of Global Removal of Price-Distorting Policies 
 
 
To see what could result from removing policies as of 2004, we examine in this section the 
results from two modeling simulations. The main one involves the full global liberalization of 
both agricultural policies and non-agricultural goods trade policies. An additional simulation, 
which liberalizes just agricultural policies globally, is also discussed towards the end of this 
section, to give a sense of the relative contribution to various outcomes of farm policies alone.  
 
Global and national economic welfare 
 
                                                 
8 The more-affluent economies of Hong Kong and Singapore are in our high-income category but, since they have 
close to free trade policies and almost no farm production anyway, their influence on the results is not 
noticeable. 
9 As well, the model does not include any divergences between private and social marginal costs and benefits that 
might arise from externalities, market failures, and other behind-the-border policies not represented in our amended 
GTAP protection database. These omissions could affect the welfare estimates in either direction.    9
Beginning with the baseline projection of the world economy in 2004, all agricultural subsidies 
and taxes plus import tariffs on other merchandise, as summarized in table 1,
10 are removed 
globally. Our LINKAGE model suggests that would lead to a global gain of $168 billion per year 
(table 2). As a share of national income, developing countries would gain nearly twice as much 
as high-income countries by completing that reform process (an average increase of 0.9 percent 
compared with 0.5 percent for high-income countries). Thus in this broad sense of a world of just 
two large country groups, completing the global reform process would reduce international 
inequality – to use the Milanovic (2005) term, taking into account each country’s economic 
size.
11 The results vary widely across developing countries, however, ranging from slight losses 
in the case of some South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries that would suffer 
exceptionally large adverse terms of trade changes to 8 percent increases in the case of Ecuador 
(whose main export item, bananas is currently heavily discriminated against in the EU market 
where former colonies and least developed countries enjoy preferential duty-free access).  
  If one were to treat each of the 60 regions in table 2 as able to be represented by a single 
household (that is, ignoring intra-region inequality), income inequality between countries as 
measured by the Gini Coefficient would be reduced at least slightly, from 0.8513 to 0.8506.
12 
The second column of numbers and those in parentheses in table 2 show the amount of 
that welfare gain due to changes in the international terms of trade for each country. For 
                                                 
10 The only other policy change is the removal of export taxes on non-farm products in Argentina This is done 
because they were introduced at the same time (end-2001) and for the same reason (for the government to gain 
popular support from the urban poor) as were the country’s export taxes on farm products.   
11 This would continue a process that began in the 1980s, when many countries began to reform their trade and 
exchange rate regimes. Using the same Linkage model and database as the present study, Valenzuela, van der 
Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009) found that the global reforms between 1980-84 and 2004 also boosted 
economic welfare in developing countries proportionately more than in high-income economies (by 1.0 percent, 
compared with 0.7 percent for high- income countries).  
12 This is a measure of inter-country inequality, in the Milanovic (2005) sense of treating each country as a single 
observation and not taking into account its economic size. It is calculated using the 60 regions and Deaton’s Gini 
coefficient calculation:    
where N is the number of regions, u is the sample average GDP, Pi is the GDP sample rank (with the highest being 1 
and the lowest a rank of N) and Xi is the GDP of country i. 
   10
developing countries as a group the terms of trade effect is slightly negative, and conversely for 
high-income countries. 
 
Regional and sectoral distribution of welfare effects 
 
 
One way to way to decompose the real income gains from full removal of price distortions 
globally, so as to better understand the sources for each region, is to assess the impacts of 
developing country liberalization versus high-income country liberalization in different 
economic sectors. These results are provided in table 3. They suggest global liberalization of 
agriculture and food markets would contribute 60 percent of the total global gains from 
merchandise reform. This is similar to the 63 per cent found for 2015 by Anderson, Martin and 
van der Mensbrugghe (2006b) using the earlier Version 6 of the GTAP database anchored on 
2001 estimates of distortions. This robust result is remarkable given the low shares of agriculture 
and food in global GDP and global merchandise trade (less than 9 percent). For developing 
countries, the importance of agricultural policies is even greater at 83 percent (compared with 
just 5 percent for high-income countries – see row 7 of table 3).  
Three-fifths of those global gains that could come from removing agricultural policies are 
accounted for by the farm policies of high-income countries (column 3 of table 3, $61 billion of 
the $101 billion per year). Those policies also account for just over half of the overall gains to 
developing countries from global agricultural and trade policy reforms (column 1 of table 3, $63 
billion of the $118 billion per year).  
 
Quantities produced and traded 
 
The full global liberalization results suggest there would be little change in the developing 
countries’ aggregate shares of global output and exports of non-farm products other than for 
textiles and apparel. Their shares in agricultural and processed food markets, however, change 
noticeably: the export share rises from 54 to 64 percent and the output share rises from 46 to 50 
percent. More significantly, the rises occur in nearly all agricultural and food industries. As a 
result, the share of global production of farm products that is exported rises dramatically for   11
many industries and, for the sector as a whole, increases from 8 to 13 percent excluding intra-EU 
trade (table 4). That ‘thickening’ of international food markets would have a substantial 
dampening effect on the instability of prices and quantities traded in those markets. 
The impact of full trade reform on agricultural and food output and trade is shown for 
each country/region in table 5, where it is clear that global farm trade is enhanced by more than 
one-third (39 percent) whereas the global value of output is virtually unchanged (dropping just 
2.6 percent). This suggests that, in aggregate, the pro-agricultural policies of high-income 
countries are not quite fully offset by the anti-agricultural policies of developing countries – 
whereas the anti-trade biases in policies of both groups of countries reinforce each other. The 
increase in exports of those goods from developing countries would be a huge $163 billion per 
year. Latin America accounts for nearly half of that increase, but all developing regions’ exports 
expand. This means their share of production exported would be much higher. It would increase 
for almost all developing countries, rising in aggregate for the group from 10 to 17 percent (table 
6).  
Also of interest is what happens to agricultural imports: developing countries as a group 
would see them growing less than farm exports (table 5). That means their food and agricultural 
self sufficiency ratios would rise, although in aggregate only slightly. For high-income countries 
that ratio would fall five percentage points (slightly less if Eastern Europe is included), while in 
East Asia and Africa it would rise two to three points, for South Asia it would be unchanged, and 
for Latin America it would jump from 112 to 126 percent (table 7).  
As already mentioned, such reform also raises substantially the share of agricultural and 
food production that is exported globally, thereby ‘thickening’ international markets, which 
would dampen international food price fluctuations and thereby reduce concerns about 
vulnerability to import dependence. The extent of this global public good aspect of agricultural 
and trade reform can be sensed for different products from the results reported in tables 8. Highly 
protected sugar and milk, as well as grains and oilseeds, are especially noteworthy. Also 
noteworthy from that table is the extent to which the developing country shares of output 
exported rise for certain products. The share of their grain production that is exported would 
double, and for meat it would more than double while for sugar it would rise nearly four-fold. 
Global exports of cotton (plant-based fibers) would become more dominated by developing   12
countries as the share of high-income cotton production exported would fall from 50 to 31 
percent.  
 
Effects on product and factor prices 
 
The average real international prices of agricultural and lightly processed food products would 
be only 1.3 percent higher in the absence of all merchandise trade distortions, or 2.0 percent if 
just agricultural policies were liberalized (table 9: the model’s numéraire is the export price 
index of high-income countries' manufactured exports). The net effects of distortions as of 2004 
are especially dampening the international prices of beef, milk, rice and cotton. But they are 
propping up the international prices of some other products, because of export taxes still in place 
in some developing countries, most notably Argentina.  
The redistributions of welfare among groups within each country following trade reform 
can be much larger than the aggregate change, partly because of the impacts on real pre-tax 
rewards to labor, capital and land. Those effects are reported in table 10, where factor rewards 
are deflated by the overall consumer price index (CPI) and also, in the case of unskilled wages, 
by the food and the food plus clothing CPIs (since those items are so prominent in the spending 
of unskilled workers). Consistent with trade theory, those results suggest unskilled workers in 
developing countries – the majority of whom work on farms – would benefit most from reform, 
followed by skilled workers, then capital owners. Returns to immobile agricultural land also rise 
in developing countries, but by less than for more-mobile factors. Land returns fall substantially 
in highly-protected Western Europe and Japan, change little in the United States, rise 
considerably in Australia and Canada and rise dramatically in dairy-intensive New Zealand. 
 
Effects on sectoral value added 
 
Also of crucial interest in terms of these policies’ impact on inequality and poverty is how they 
affect value added in agriculture, in other words net farm income. These results for full global 
reform are reported in the first four columns of table 11. They show that for developing countries 
as a group, value added in agriculture rises by 5.6 percent, compared with 1.9 percent for non-
agriculture, following full global reform of all merchandise trade. Latin America is where net   13
farm income expands most, averaging 37 percent but exceeding 100 percent for Argentina and 
Ecuador and 40-50 percent for Brazil and Colombia. In East Asia it also expands considerably, 
and more than non-agricultural value added – including in China. However, among the countries 
listed in Africa, net farm incomes would increase substantially only in Mozambique, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, and for the continent as a whole including North Africa they would fall very slightly 
(by less than 1 percent). Partly that is because non-agricultural primary sectors – in which 
numerous African countries have a strong comparative advantage – would expand (raising 
Africa’s self-sufficiency in that sector from 180 to 189 percent – see table 7), and that in turn 
would boost production and employment of non-tradable goods and services. Net farm incomes 
are estimated to fall also in South Asia (by 7 percent), but there it is textiles and clothing that 
would expand (raising self-sufficiency from 144 to 153 percent) and, in India where the 
skilled/unskilled wage differential rises, also skill-intensive goods and services production. 
 
Effects on poverty using the elasticities approach 
 
The above results for real factor rewards and net farm income suggest both inequality and 
poverty could be alleviated globally by agricultural and trade policy liberalization. It is possible 
to go a step or two further in assessing reform impacts on poverty with a global model, even with 
only one single representative household per country. That involves using the elasticities 
approach, which is employed here in two ways. The first involves taking the impact on real 
household income, applying an estimated income to poverty elasticity, and then assessing the 
impacts on the poverty headcount index for each country. This simple approach assumes 
distributional neutrality: the poor receive the same proportional increase in real income as the 
average household in the economy, and all are subject to the same higher rate of direct income 
taxation to replace the customs revenue forgone because of trade liberalization.  
A slightly more complex but more reasonable approach is to link key model variables to 
the possible change in the average per capita consumption of the poor, that is, to capture from the 
model’s results some of the distributional aspects of the changes in real income, rather than 
simply the average gain. This has been done by calculating the change in the (pre-tax) average 
wage of unskilled workers deflated by the food and clothing CPI—presumably the most relevant 
consumer prices for the poor, including those many poor farm and other rural households that   14
earn most of their income from wages and are net buyers of food. These workers are assumed to 
be exempt from the direct income tax imposed to replace the lost customs revenue following 
trade reform—a realistic assumption for many developing countries.
13  
Table 12 summarizes the key poverty results to emerge from the global reform scenario 
using both of these approaches. As is clear from the comparison, the more-naïve first approach 
yields little change in poverty numbers, so we concentrate attention here on the results generated 
using the more realistic second approach. 
Under the full merchandise trade reform scenario, extreme poverty (the number of people 
surviving on less than US$1 a day) in developing countries would drop by 26 million relative to 
the baseline level of just under one billion, a reduction of 2.7 percent. The proportional reduction 
in China is much higher than in other developing countries, though: 3.7 percent compared with 
2.6 percent. This would continue the trend of the recent past, with China being the region where 
poverty alleviation has been most numerous (see Chen and Ravallion 2007, 2008). Nonetheless, 
in this scenario the number of extreme poor in Sub-Saharan Africa would fall by 3.7 percent. In 
India (though not in the rest of South Asia), by contrast, the number of extreme poor is estimated 
to rise, by 4.0 percent. 
Recall that this set of poverty calculations is based on the change in the real wage of 
unskilled workers, deflated by the food and clothing CPI. The average change in the real 
unskilled wage over all developing countries is 5.9 percent—six times greater than the average 
net income increase in developing countries (after raising direct taxes to compensate for the loss 
of tariff revenue), assuming that the change in unskilled wages is fully passed through to 
households. This suggests such reform would deliver a marked reduction in income inequality 
within developing countries on average. 
Under the broader definition of poverty—those living on no more than US$2 per day—
the number of poor in developing countries would fall by 87 million under the full reform 
scenario compared to an aggregate baseline level of nearly 2.5 billion. This represents a 
somewhat larger proportionate reduction in the number of poor in developing countries, of 3.4 
percent, or 3.7 percent if China is excluded. The proportionate decline in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
2.7 percent, while for India there is still an increase, of 1.7 percent. 
                                                 
13 Even if the fiscal closure affects a domestic sales or value added tax instead of direct taxes on households, in 
many countries food is exempt from taxation, or the tax is difficult to collect in practice because of the informal 






As with all modeling, the results depend on the assumptions made in structuring the model. Of 
particular relevance here is that several assumptions bias downwards the estimates of welfare 
gains from trade. They include constant (rather than increasing) returns to scale, no productivity 
effects of reform (for example, of the sort stressed by Melitz 2003), and no possibility for new 
markets to be created following reform. As well, there is always the issue of product and regional 
aggregation: the less disaggregated is the specification of the world economy, the smaller the 
estimated benefits from reform. This is because there is no accounting for welfare gains from 
adjustments within aggregated sectors or regions.  
As for the effects on poverty, the crude methodology used at the end of the previous 
section of this chapter is meant simply as a beginning of our examination of the poverty 
consequences of global trade reform. The Linkage model global reform results presented above 
are used in the next chapter (Bussolo, De Hoyos and Medvedev 2010), in association with micro-
simulation survey data for individual countries, to assess the effects on the distribution of income 
between and within 101 countries. It is thus able to say much more precisely what the inequality 
and poverty effects of 2004 policies are for the world. Then in Parts II to IV of this volume, 
individual developing country case studies examine (again with the help of micro-simulation 
national survey data) the effects of not only own-country policies but also the policies of the rest 
of the world. The border price and export demand shocks associated with rest-of-world 
liberalization are almost the same as those presented above, the only difference being that, for 
each of the case study countries, a separate global simulation has been run that excludes reform 
by the case study country under examination. Those border shocks are reported for all of the case 




   16
 
The findings presented above, aimed at understanding the global economic effects of the 
agricultural and trade policies remaining in place as of 2004, can be summarized as follows: 
 
•  as a share of national income, developing countries would gain nearly twice as much as 
high-income countries by removing those policies (an average increase of 0.9 percent 
compared with 0.5 percent for high-income countries, such that international income 
inequality between countries would improve; 
•   even inter-country inequality (not taking into account differences in the economic size of 
nations) as measured by the Gini Coefficient would improve slightly even though some 
developing countries (notably in South Asia) would lose and a few (e.g. Ecuador) would 
gain many times more than the average; 
•  of those prospective welfare gains from global liberalization, 60 percent would come 
from agriculture and food policy reform – a striking result given that the shares of 
agriculture and food in global GDP and global merchandise trade are less than 9 percent; 
•  the contribution of agricultural policy reform to the prospective welfare gain for 
developing countries is even greater, at 83 percent; 
•  with full goods trade liberalization, the share of global production of farm products that is 
exported would rise from 8 to 13 percent excluding intra-EU trade, thereby ‘thickening’ 
international food markets and reducing instability of prices and quantities traded in those 
markets;  
•  unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of whom work on farms – 
would benefit most from reform (followed by skilled workers and then capital owners), 
with the average change in the real unskilled wage over all developing countries rising 
3.8 percent or nearly five times more than the average net income increase in developing 
countries;  
•  net farm incomes in developing countries would rise by 5.6 percent, compared with 1.9 
percent for non-agricultural value added, suggesting that inequality as between farm and 
nonfarm households in developing countries would fall;  
•  by contrast, in high-income countries net farm incomes would fall by 15 percent on 
average (compared with a slight rise for real non-farm value added), so inequality   17
between farm households in those countries versus in developing countries would reduce 
substantially; and 
•  extreme poverty (the number of people surviving on less than US$1 a day) in developing 
countries would drop by 29 million relative to the baseline level of just under one billion, 
a reduction of 3 percent (and 4 percent when the more moderate US$2 a day poverty 
level is used). 
To get a more precise sense of the inequality and poverty effects within countries, and to 
explore the extent to which it is own-country as distinct from rest-of world’s policies that are 
doing the harm, requires country case studies using national economy-wide models that are 
enhanced with detailed earning and spending information of numerous types of urban and rural 
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Table 1: Structure of producer price distortions in global goods markets,
a 2004  












Subsidy Tariff  Tariff 
Africa  -0.8 0.1 20.4  11.2 
Egypt  0.0 0.0  5.0  13.5 
Madagascar  0.0 -4.4  3.4 2.7 
Mozambique  0.2 0.0 14.5  10.9 
Nigeria  0.1 0.0 76.1  17.2 
Senegal  0.0 -1.1  6.2 8.9 
South Africa  0.0 0.0 10.2 6.5 
Uganda  0.0 -2.6  9.2 5.5 
Tanzania  -0.3 0.0 11.8  13.7 
Zambia  -0.8 0.0  7.0 9.0 
Zimbabwe  -3.2 0.0  8.9  15.4 
Rest of Africa  -1.2 0.3 19.0  13.4 
East and South Asia  2.4 0.6 29.6 8.1 
China  0.0 0.2  6.5 7.1 
Korea  0.0 0.0  319.4 5.9 
Taiwan  -0.4 0.0 84.2 3.9 
Indonesia  0.0 -1.6  7.3 4.9 
Malasya  0.0 -0.2  5.0 5.9 
Philippines  -4.7 0.0  7.1 3.4 
Thailand  -0.2 0.0 26.2  12.9 
Vietnam  -3.6 -0.5  21.5  18.5 
Bangladesh  -1.0 0.0  9.9  22.5 
India  10.1 2.5  2.9  20.8 
Pakistan  0.0 -0.2  19.4  18.5 
Sri Lanka  0.6 -0.3  23.8 5.8 
Rest of East and South Asia  -0.7 0.0  4.3 2.7 
Latin America  -0.2 -1.4  7.2 6.7 
Argentina  0.0 -14.8  0.0  5.8 
Brazil  0.0 0.0  4.8 8.9 
Chile  0.0 0.0  2.4 1.8 
Colombia  0.0 0.0 21.6 9.8 
Ecuador  0.0 0.0 13.4  10.4 
Mexico  1.2 0.0  6.2 3.4 
Nicaragua  0.0 -2.8  9.6 3.9 
Rest of Latin America  -1.7 0.3  9.9 9.9 
EEurope & Central Asia  0.8 -0.3  15.9 4.8 
Baltic States  3.4 0.0  8.2 0.9 
Bulgary  0.6 0.0 14.8  11.5 
CZE Republic  0.6 0.0  3.0 0.5 
Hungary  3.1 0.0  6.2 0.5 
Poland  0.4 0.0  6.2 0.8 
(continued)   22
Table 1 (continued): Structure of producer price distortions in global goods markets,














Subsidy Tariff  Tariff 
       
Romania  1.3 0.0 18.0 9.8 
Slovakia  0.0 0.0  5.2 0.4 
Slovenia  0.0 0.0  7.8 0.4 
Russia  1.7 -0.9  18.9 7.4 
Kazakhstan  -0.9 0.0  3.4 2.7 
Turkey  0.8 0.0 33.3 3.1 
Rest of EEurope and CAsia  -1.1 -0.9  9.7 5.7 
High-income countries  2.6 7.2 22.3 1.2 
Australia  0.0 0.0  0.5 3.3 
Canada  1.6 3.6 18.9 1.4 
EU15  1.2 12.8  6.9  0.7 
Japan  2.0 0.0  151.7 1.7 
New Zealand  0.0 -0.2  0.7 3.3 
Rest West Europe  2.6 13.4  53.9  2.2 
USA  5.2 0.6  6.1 1.3 
Developing countries   1.4 0.0 21.8 7.5 
  Africa  -0.8 0.1 20.4  11.2 
  East Asia   -0.3 0.0 41.6 6.7 
  South Asia   7.2 1.7  6.9  20.2 
  Latin America  -0.2 -1.4  7.2 6.7 
  Middle East  -12.4 0.0  7.5 5.7 
  EEurope and CAsia  0.8 -0.3  15.9 4.8 
WORLD TOTAL  1.9 3.5 22.1 3.3 
 
 
a Using value of production at undistorted prices as weights. 
 
Source: Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), based on calculations compiled by Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008).   23
Table 2: Impact on real income of full liberalization of global merchandise trade, by 
country/region, 2004 
 







income due just 








         
North and Sub Saharan Africa  0.9  -6.0  0.2  (-1.1) 
Egypt -0.2  -0.6  -0.3  (-0.9) 
Madagascar 0.0  0.0  -0.9  (-1.2) 
Mozambique 0.1  -0.1  2.4  (-2.0) 
Nigeria 0.3  -0.6  0.7  (-1.3) 
Senegal 0.0  -0.1  -2.3  (-4.0) 
South Africa  0.2  -0.7  0.1  (-0.5) 
Uganda 0.0  0.0  -0.6  (-0.1) 
Tanzania 0.0  0.0  -0.5  (-0.4) 
Zambia 0.0  0.0  0.1  (-0.3) 
Zimbabwe 0.1  0.0  3.4  (0.5) 
Rest of Africa  0.5  -3.8  0.2  (-1.5) 
East and South Asia  29.7  -4.9  0.9  (-0.1) 
China 3.3  0.5  0.2  (0.0) 
Korea 14.0  0.2  2.8  (0.0) 
Taiwan 1.0  0.0  0.4  (0.0) 
Indonesia 0.5  0.0  0.2  (0.0) 
Malaysia 4.2  -1.0  4.7  (-1.1) 
Philippines 0.0  -0.5  0.1  (-0.7) 
Thailand 3.3  -0.1  1.4  (-0.1) 
Vietnam 1.9  -0.9  5.3  (-2.5) 
Bangladesh -0.2  -0.8  -0.4  (-1.7) 
India -0.8  -2.9  -0.2  (-0.6) 
Pakistan -0.1  -0.6  -0.2  (-0.8) 
Sri Lanka  0.8  0.5  5.1  (3.1) 
Rest of East and South Asia  1.9  0.8  1.4  (0.5) 
Latin America   15.8  2.5  1.0  (0.2) 
Argentina 3.2  -0.7  2.6  (-0.6) 
Brazil 6.8  5.6  1.6  (1.3) 
Chile 0.3  0.2  0.4  (0.3) 
Colombia 2.2  0.7  3.1  (1.0) 
Ecuador 2.0  1.1  8.2  (4.4) 
Mexico -0.7  -3.4  -0.1  (-0.6) 
Nicaragua 0.0  0.0  1.3  (0.4) 
Rest of Latin America  2.0  -1.0  0.5  (-0.3) 
EEurope & Central Asia  14.2  -3.6  1.2  (-0.3) 
Baltic States  0.5  0.1  1.8  (0.3) 
Bulgaria 0.2  -0.2  1.4  (-1.4) 
Czech Republic  1.0  -0.1 1.4  (-0.2) 
Hungary 0.4  -0.1  0.6  (-0.1)   24
Poland 2.0  0.1  1.2  (0.1) 
Romania -0.1  -0.7  -0.3  (-1.9) 
Slovakia 0.7  0.1  2.3  (0.4) 
Slovenia 0.3  0.1  1.5  (0.3) 
Russia 5.4  -3.1  1.2  (-0.7) 
Kazakhstan 0.4  0.2  1.1  (0.6) 
Turkey 1.3  -0.5  0.6  (-0.2) 
Rest of EEurope & Central Asia  2.2  0.5  2.1  (0.4) 
High-income countries  102.8  11.3  0.5  (0.1) 
Australia 2.4  1.9  0.5  (0.4) 
Canada 0.6  -1.2  0.1  (-0.2) 
EU 15  56.8  -3.8  0.7  (0.0) 
Japan 23.1  10.4  0.7  (0.3) 
New Zealand  2.2  1.8  3.2  (2.6) 
Rest of Western Europe  13.1  -0.1  2.7  (0.0) 
United States  2.8  0.9  0.0  (0.0) 
Hong Kong and Singapore  1.7  1.4  1.4  (1.1) 
Developing countries  64.9 -12.2  0.9  (-0.2) 
North Africa  0.9  -2.8  0.5  (-1.5) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0  -3.2  0.0  (-0.9) 
East Asia   30.1  -1.0  1.1  (0.0) 
South Asia  -0.4  -3.9  -0.1  (-0.6) 
Latin America   15.8  2.5  1.0  (0.2) 
Middle East  4.2  -0.2  0.8  (0.0) 
EEurope & Central Asia  14.2  -3.6  1.2  (-0.3) 
World total  167.7  -1.0  0.6  (0.0) 
 
a Numbers in parentheses refer to that due to terms of trade effects. 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations   25
Table 3: Regional and sectoral sources of welfare gains from full liberalization of global 
merchandise trade, 2004 
 
(relative to the 2004 benchmark data in 2004 US dollars and percent) 
 
   Gains
a by region in $billion  Percent of regional gain
b 
              
   Developing 
High-
income World Developing 
High-
income World 
              
Developing countries liberalize:             
Agriculture and light processing  35.6 4.7  40.3  30.1 9.4  24.0 
Manufacturing and services  6.0 51.5  57.5  5.1  103.9  34.3 
Total  41.6 56.2  97.7  35.2  113.3  58.3 
              
High-income countries liberalize:             
Agriculture and light processing  62.6 -2.0  60.6  53.0 -4.0  36.1 
Manufacturing and services  13.9 -4.6 9.3  11.8 -9.3  5.6 
Total  76.5 -6.6  69.9  64.8  -13.3  41.7 
              
All countries liberalize:             
Agriculture and light processing  98.2 2.7  100.9  83.1 5.4  60.1 
Manufacturing and services  19.9 46.9  66.8  16.9 94.6  39.9 
Total  118.1 49.6  167.7  70.4 29.6  100.0 
 
a Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to sum to 100 percent 
b Percentage in last row refers to the total regional gain relative to the world total. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations   26
Table 4: Impact of full global liberalization on shares of global output exported, and developing 
country shares of global output and exports,
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Developing countries' 






















                
Paddy  rice  1  2 81 82 56 42 
Wheat  16 22 67 71 25 39 
Other  grains  11 15 55 57 35 56 
Oil  seeds  21 28 69 74 54 68 
Plant-based  fibers  25 25 74 83 50 79 
Vegetables  and  fruits  9 15 72 77 69 80 
Other  crops  14 17 49 49 75 62 
Cattle  sheep  etc  2  2 43 48 56 59 
Other  livestock  4  4 65 67 43 46 
Wool  13 14 82 81 16 18 
Beef  and  sheep  meat  7 21 27 41 31 68 
Other  meat  products  7 12 32 34 42 45 
Vegetable  oils  and  fats  20 30 52 58 80 84 
Dairy  products  5 11 29 33 28 41 
Processed  rice  5  7 76 79 85 87 
Refined  sugar  8 42 52 85 78 90 
Other food, beverages and tobacco  9 12 35 36 50 59 
Other  primary  products  31 33 64 63 76 76 
Textile  and  wearing  apparel  28 35 53 57 74 77 
Other  manufacturing  24 26 32 31 43 43 
Services  3  3 20 20 31 30 
Agriculture  and  food  8 13 46 50 54 64 
Agriculture  8 11 62 65 55 64 
Processed  foods  8 14 37 40 52 63 
 
aexcluding intra-EU trade. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations   27
Table 5: Impacts of full global trade liberalization on agricultural and food output and trade, by 
country/region, 2004 
 
(relative to 2004 benchmark data, in 2004 billion US dollars and percent) 
   $billion 
Percent change relative to 
baseline 
   Output Exports  Imports  Output  Exports  Imports 
              
North and Sub Saharan Africa  13.8  20.5  10.0  7.2  99.1  46.0 
Egypt 0.4  0.5  -0.1  2.2  39.2  -4.2 
Madagascar 0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.4  2.7  -4.3 
Mozambique 0.9  1.0  0.1  52.3  597.1  33.3 
Nigeria -0.5  0.4  0.7  -2.9  92.8  43.1 
Senegal 0.0  0.0  0.0  -1.9  35.0  0.3 
South Africa  0.7  0.9  0.8  2.4  26.7  42.9 
Uganda 0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.6  1.3  1.5 
Tanzania 0.0  0.2  0.1  -0.7  28.5  31.2 
Zambia 0.1  0.1  0.0  5.2  22.3  35.9 
Zimbabwe 0.4  0.3  0.1  25.7  38.0  39.2 
Rest of Africa  12.0  17.0  8.3  10.5  133.1  64.3 
East and South Asia  25.0  39.5  24.7  2.7  83.4  36.7 
China 6.2  7.7  6.7  1.7  76.5  27.5 
Korea -1.0  1.0  6.2  -1.7  194.1  75.0 
Taiwan -1.9  0.3  1.5  -9.1  62.8  35.5 
Indonesia 1.1  1.6  1.0  1.8  21.6  21.5 
Malaysia 1.6  1.3  0.7  8.9  17.0  17.8 
Philippines 1.1  1.9  0.8  3.5  120.5  35.0 
Thailand 9.5  8.3  1.9  17.4  133.0  78.1 
Vietnam 0.5  1.1  0.6  3.3  54.0  55.6 
Bangladesh -0.6  0.4  0.8  -2.4  261.2  38.3 
India 1.1  9.0  1.4  0.5  131.2  24.2 
Pakistan -0.6  0.5  1.0  -1.3  45.0  43.0 
Sri Lanka  -0.1  -0.1  0.6  -1.2  -18.2  69.3 
Rest of East and South Asia  8.0  6.4  1.4  41.5  266.1  29.5 
Latin America   87.2  71.5  7.2  26.8  106.4  29.8 
Argentina 12.2  15.1  0.3  37.8  95.6  81.8 
Brazil 45.8  25.7  2.1  45.3  100.7  94.8 
Chile 0.5  0.4  0.2  4.7  11.3  15.8 
Colombia 3.1  4.9  1.1  14.6  161.4  81.7 
Ecuador 4.2  4.6  0.3  46.1  198.7  71.8 
Mexico -0.3  0.3  0.4  -0.4  5.8  4.3 
Nicaragua 0.0  0.1  0.0  2.9  21.6  19.4 
Rest of Latin America  21.6  20.4  2.8  25.7  175.9  30.4 
EEurope & Central Asia  -10.4  17.4 20.3  -2.6 79.7  77.6 
Baltic States  -1.2  -0.1  0.4  -16.9  -15.5  30.9 
Bulgaria 4.2  2.6  0.6  6.6  366.5  118.1 
Czech Republic  -2.2  -0.1 0.7  -12.0  -10.9 40.5 
Hungary -0.9  0.4  0.8  -6.0  17.1  66.6 
Poland 1.7  2.5  2.5  3.9  80.7  88.8 
Romania -0.2  1.3  1.1  -1.0  190.5  78.3   28
Slovakia -0.9  -0.1  0.4  -11.3  -12.0  64.1 
Slovenia -0.6  -0.1  0.2  -17.1  -54.1  26.2 
Russia -12.9  3.2  8.8  -13.1  179.4  98.9 
Kazakhstan 1.5  1.4  0.0 11.8 142.9  11.6 
Turkey -2.0  2.3  2.9  -3.1  61.5  92.1 
Rest of EEurope & Central Asia  3.0  4.1  2.0  7.7  71.3  53.4 
High-income countries  -233.2  -9.2  89.8  -13.1  -4.0  38.3 
Australia 12.0  7.0  0.2  19.8  41.2  11.1 
Canada -1.6  3.6  2.7  -2.4  24.1  32.8 
EU 15  -190.9  -38.8  50.9  -21.2  -29.2  31.9 
Japan -39.1  0.4  16.8  -22.9  87.7  69.1 
New Zealand  10.6  6.4  0.2  46.6  74.3  27.1 
Rest of Western Europe  -11.6  11.7  9.8  -19.4  312.0  132.7 
United States  -12.8  0.6  9.3  -2.6  1.1  32.4 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.1  0.0  0.1  2.1  6.3  1.6 
Developing countries  137.6  163.6 64.6 7.1  100.0  40.4 
North Africa  11.4  13.3  6.1  17.3  377.2  62.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.5  7.2  3.8  1.9  41.9  32.3 
East Asia   25.1  29.5  20.8  4.0  77.4  37.4 
South Asia  -0.1  10.0  3.9  0.0  108.3  33.2 
Latin America   87.2  71.5  7.2  26.8  106.4  29.8 
Middle East  22.0  14.8  2.5  21.5  222.7  12.1 
EEurope & Central Asia  -10.4  17.4  20.3  -2.6  79.7  77.6 
World total  -95.7  154.4  154.4  -2.6  39.1  39.1 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations   29










    
Developing countries  9.5  16.9 
North Africa  6.3  20.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa  13.8  19.3 
East Asia   8.4  15.1 
South Asia  3.7  7.5 
Latin America   18.1  28.2 
Middle East  7.4  17.2 
EEurope & Central Asia  6.8  11.1 
High-income countries  13.0  14.1 
World total  11.4  15.4 
 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations  
Table 7: Impact of global liberalization on self sufficiency
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EEurope & 
Central Asia 















                                         
Paddy  rice  101 105 100  99  97  96  93  72  100  101  101  101  95  92 
Wheat  141  140 88 89  67  46  80  98  68  65  100  98  102  117 
Other  grains  108  102 94 98  94  91  98  119  88  81  103  105  103  113 
Oil  seeds  104 92 97  103  104  130  140  167  66  51  100  101  106  115 
Plant-based  fibers  161  112 88 97  177  265  94  107  54  58  93  95  104  118 
Vegetables and fruits  90  78  105  109  108  103  153  221  102  104  99  98  99  92 
Other  crops  90  91 113 110  138  138  143  133  110  104  104  104  90  88 
Cattle  sheep  etc  100 100 100 100  101  99  102  102  98  97  100  100  102  102 
Other  livestock  101 101 100 100  101  100  101  100  99  99  100  100  99  98 
Wool  161  180  92  91 103  104 103  102  78 75  96 93  96 99 
Beef and sheep meat  101  85  97  134  96  102  108  183  83  77  126  652  95  85 
Other meat products  100  99  100  103  92  85  121  143  101  103  96  95  96  93 
Vegetable oils and fats  95  85  103  114  69  191  141  143  115  116  78  66  93  96 
Dairy  products  103 100  94 101  76  79  97  102  78  78  99  99  102  104 
Processed  rice  99  95 100 101  69  63  94  85  104  108  104  104  92  87 
Refined  sugar  98  41 102 133  95  100  131  227  98  196  96  91  98  70 
Other food, bev. and tob.  99  97  103  105  101  100  108  112  105  113  106  94  100  98 
Other  primary  products  76  76 122 122  180  189  148  155  84  82  75  69  115  116 
Textile and wearing app.  81  76  123  128  98  91  104  91  144  155  144  153  101  95 
Other  manufacturing  101  102 98 96  77  74  96  91  106  105  90  89  95  95 
Services  101 101 101 101  101  102  100  100  101  100  100  101  101  101 
Agriculture  and  food  100  95 101 105  100  103  112  126  100  102  100  100  99  98 
Agriculture  99  96 100 102  104  103  115  126  96  95  100  100  100  101 
Processed  foods  100  95 101 108  94  103  110  126  104  111  100  101  99  96 
a Self sufficiency is defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption measured in value terms at fob prices. 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 
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Table 8: Share of production exported and of consumption imported by world, high-income and developing countries, before and after 
full global liberalization of all merchandise trade, by product, 2004 
(percent) 
   Share of production exported  Share of consumption imported 
 High-income  countries
a  Developing countries    High-income countries
a Developing  countries 
  
2004 
benchmark Global  lib. 
2004 
benchmark Global  lib.  
2004 
 benchmark  Global lib. 
2004 
benchmark Global  lib. 
Paddy  rice  3  7 1 1    2 3 1 2 
Wheat  37  47  6 12    11 25 17 21 
Other  grains  15  16  7 15    9 14 11 15 
Oil  seeds  31  34 16 25    26 36 16 22 
Plant-based  fibers  50  31 17 24    18 22 26 25 
Vegetables and fruits  10  13  9  15    18  30  4  7 
Other  crops  7  13 21 22    16 20 11 14 
Cattle  sheep  etc  1  2 2 2    2 2 2 2 
Other  livestock  6  7 3 3    6 6 3 3 
Wool  60  62  2  3    35 31 10 12 
Beef  and  sheep  meat  6  11  7 35    5 24 10 13 
Other  meat  products  6  10  9 16    6 12  8 14 
Vegetable  oils  and  fats  8  11 31 43    12 24 26 34 
Dairy  products  5  10  4 14    2 10 10 14 
Processed  rice  3  4 5 8    4 9 5 7 
Refined  sugar  4  30 12 44    5 66 10 25 
Other food, bev. and tob.  7  8  12  20    8  10  9  16 
Other  primary  products  20  21 37 39    38 39 22 24 
Textile  and  wearing  app. 15  19 39 48    30 37 23 31 
Other  manufacturing  20  21 32 36    19 20 32 38 
Services  3  3 5 4    2 2 5 5 
Agriculture  and  food  7 9  9 17    8 13  8 12 
Agriculture  9  11  7 11    10 15  7  9 
Processed  foods  6 9 12 23    7 13 10 16 
a Excluding intra-EU trade 
Source: Authors’ Linkage model simulations Table 9: Impact of full global liberalization on real international product prices, 2004 
 







    
Paddy rice  6.9  6.6 
Wheat 1.8  1.4 
Other grains  2.6  2.7 
Oil seeds  -2.2  -2.4 
Sugar cane and beet  -1.1  -2.0 
Plant-based fibers  4.7  2.9 
Vegetables and fruits  2.4  1.8 
Other crops  1.7  1.0 
Cattle sheep etc  -0.2  -1.1 
Other livestock  -1.2  -2.1 
Raw milk  0.7  -0.2 
Wool 3.5  3.3 
Beef and sheep meat  5.6  4.6 
Other meat products  1.3  0.6 
Vegetable oils and fats  -1.4  -1.9 
Dairy products  4.6  3.8 
Processed rice  2.8  2.9 
Refined sugar  2.5  1.3 
Other food, beverages and tobacco  -1.7  -1.3 
Textile and wearing apparel  0.3  -1.2 
Other manufacturing  0.2  -0.2 
Merchandise trade  0.3  -0.2 
Agriculture and food  0.8  0.3 
    Agriculture  1.5  0.9 
    Agriculture and light processing  2.0  1.3 
 
Note: Model numéraire is the export price index of high-income countries' 
manufactured exports 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations Table 10: Impacts of full global merchandise trade liberalization on real pre-tax factor 
prices, by country and region, 2004 
 
(relative to the benchmark data, percent) 
 
 
Nominal change deflated by 
aggregate CPI 





















North and Sub Saharan Africa  4.7 4.3  0.1  4.4 5.8 6.9 
Egypt 3.2  1.7  3.4  2.3  2.2  2.9 
Madagascar 2.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.8  -0.8  -0.7 
Mozambique -0.2  4.3  -5.8  10.7  12.0  13.0 
Nigeria 10.1  10.5  -1.3  3.2  7.7  8.6 
Senegal 2.4  3.2  0.7  3.1  2.6  3.6 
South Africa  1.8  2.4  -0.1  1.6  1.7  3.6 
Uganda 2.2  0.7  -0.8  0.2  0.2  0.5 
Tanzania 2.1  2.4  1.6  2.8  2.6  3.0 
Zambia 2.6  3.2  0.7  3.0  3.1  3.5 
Zimbabwe 6.7  11.8  23.1  13.6  15.9  16.8 
Rest of Africa  6.2  5.5  1.1  6.4  7.2  8.5 
East and South Asia  3.4 3.0  -1.8  3.2 4.6 4.8 
China 1.9  2.0  3.6  2.6  1.6  2.1 
Korea 7.1  6.5  -14.5  5.8  26.6  22.7 
Taiwan 2.4  2.8  -11.8  3.3  10.9  10.3 
Indonesia 0.7  0.7  0.1  1.4  1.5  1.8 
Malaysia 10.7  10.2  3.6  11.1  32.3  29.2 
Philippines -1.0  1.4  7.2  8.5  9.2  9.4 
Thailand 2.6  3.5  7.5  5.6  8.5  7.8 
Vietnam 17.7  16.0  9.1  19.6  23.9  26.7 
Bangladesh 2.1  2.8  2.8  3.3  4.5  5.3 
India 2.1  0.2  -8.5  -1.9  -4.4  -3.8 
Pakistan 3.9  3.5  1.5  3.8  3.3  3.5 
Sri Lanka  0.1  14.1  0.9  3.0  4.8  4.8 
Rest of East and South Asia  2.0  2.9  6.5  5.1  8.3  9.1 
Latin America   1.4 1.9  21.1  4.5 2.4 4.1 
Argentina -3.1  4.1  43.6  8.8  4.9  7.2 
Brazil 1.3  2.7  26.5  1.4  0.2  1.1 
Chile 1.3  0.5  3.0  1.3  1.1  1.9 
Colombia -0.8  0.3  30.2  6.0  4.4  5.6 
Ecuador 2.1  -1.2  61.7  15.1  12.1  13.9 
Mexico 0.5  0.5  2.3  0.8  -2.3  0.9 
Nicaragua 1.9  2.5  2.1  3.8  3.9  4.7 
Rest of Latin America  0.8  1.5  18.0  5.4  4.9  6.1 
Europe & Central Asia  3.2 2.6  -4.5  1.7 4.2 4.5 
Baltic States  3.9  2.0  -9.8  1.3  5.6  5.0 
Bulgaria 0.3  1.6  5.9  2.5  1.8  2.3 
Czech Republic  2.4  1.5 -26.1  0.7  3.9  3.3 
Hungary 2.2  1.1  -19.9  -1.0  1.6  1.4 Poland 3.9  2.6  -24.6  0.5  5.2  4.6 
Romania 4.5  3.5  -3.4  3.4  4.5  5.7 
Slovakia 2.9  2.2  -15.9  1.0  4.9  4.0 
Slovenia 2.3  1.8  -17.2  1.3  4.9  4.2 
Russia 3.9  3.8  -1.9  2.5  4.3  5.1 
Kazakhstan 1.0  1.4  14.0 3.0  2.4  3.3 
Turkey 2.1  1.4  -3.4  0.4  1.8  1.8 
Rest of EEurope & Central Asia  3.7  4.2  12.7  6.3  9.7  10.3 
High-income countries  1.0 0.5  -17.9  0.2 3.3 3.3 
Australia 0.4  0.8  9.4  1.3  0.0  1.6 
Canada 0.5  0.4  6.3  0.4  1.7  2.7 
EU 15  1.7  0.6  -39.5  -0.1  4.2  3.6 
Japan 1.7  1.2  -29.3  0.9  6.5  6.0 
New Zealand  -1.2  1.5  34.8  5.9  6.2  7.3 
Rest of Western Europe  3.1  3.1  -50.6  0.8  19.3  14.0 
United States  0.2  0.1  -2.9  -0.1  -2.0  0.0 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.3  0.8  0.4  2.2  1.8  2.4 
Developing countries  3.0 2.9  1.6  3.5 5.5 5.9 
North Africa  7.7  5.3  -0.5  7.0  9.3  10.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  3.2  3.8  0.2  3.2  4.4  5.3 
East Asia and Pacific  3.4  3.3  1.9  4.0  6.9  6.9 
South Asia  2.3  1.2  -6.2  -0.6  -2.5  -1.9 
Latin America   1.4  1.9  21.1  4.5  2.4  4.1 
Middle East  2.9  4.7  43.8  8.3  17.0  16.5 
EEurope & Central Asia  3.2  2.6  -4.5  1.7  4.2  4.5 
World total  1.3 1.2  -3.1  0.9 3.6 3.8 
 
a The user cost of capital and land represents the subsidy inclusive rental cost. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations Table 11: Effects of full global liberalization of agricultural and all merchandise trade 
on sectoral value added (GDP), by country and region, 2004 
 

























                   
North and Sub Saharan Africa  0.1 5.1 -0.9  -0.2  0.1  0.8  -0.9 0.0 
Egypt  0.1 0.2 0.0  -0.7  1.3  0.4  -0.1 -1.1 
Madagascar  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1 -3.2 0.1 -3.4  -3.1 
Mozambique  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.0 23.6 0.6 22.7  0.1 
Nigeria  -0.6  0.2  -1.2  -0.8 -4.8 0.5 -9.3  -1.7 
Senegal  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.5  -0.8  -1.1 -0.8 
South Africa  -0.2  0.7  -0.1  0.1 -2.7 0.4 -0.7  0.1 
Uganda  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 -1.6  -0.4 -2.9  -1.6 
Tanzania  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.1  0.6  -0.3  -0.3 -1.3 
Zambia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.7  0.5 0.6  0.6 
Zimbabwe  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2 24.2 0.8 38.9  4.9 
Rest of Africa  0.5  3.9  0.0  1.4 0.7  1.4 0.1  0.5 
East and South Asia  -1.4 24.4  2.0  100.7 -0.3 0.7  0.5  2.9 
China  4.6  2.5  9.4  37.5 2.8  0.2 5.7  3.0 
Korea  -4.0  7.2  -3.2  31.3 -18.7  1.2 -15.1  5.4 
Taiwan  -0.5 0.8 -0.5  10.1  -11.3  0.3  -9.9 3.7 
Indonesia  0.3  1.1  0.2  2.7 1.1  0.5 0.8  1.2 
Malaysia  -0.2  0.9  -0.1  4.0 -6.3 0.8 -2.0  3.8 
Philippines  1.7  0.3  1.9  1.0 13.8 0.5 15.6  1.7 
Thailand  2.9  2.7  3.0  7.3 14.0 1.0 14.3  2.8 
Vietnam  1.4  0.0  1.2  4.5 22.8 0.0 18.8  15.6 
Bangladesh  -0.2  0.4  -0.3  -2.1 -2.6 0.9 -3.8  -4.4 
India  -7.8  6.3 -10.6  -1.3 -6.1 1.4 -8.3  -0.3 
Pakistan  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  0.2 -1.0  -0.1 -0.5  0.2 
Sri Lanka  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.3 0.0  0.1 7.1  9.6 
Rest of East and South Asia  0.6 2.3 0.7  4.3  9.6  1.4  11.2 2.7 
Latin America   40.0  42.2  40.7  34.6 36.3 2.8 37.0  2.3 
Argentina  12.4  8.1  10.9  15.1 116.8  7.4 103.5  13.8 
Brazil  12.2  22.7  13.0  21.3 40.1 4.4 42.6  4.2 
Chile  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.7 5.0  0.3 5.5  0.9 
Colombia  5.0  2.1  5.0  1.2 53.5 2.7 53.5  1.5 
Ecuador  2.6  2.9  2.9  1.7 113.1 11.4 126.0  6.7 
Mexico  -0.2 0.6 0.1  -3.4  -1.0  0.2  0.3 -1.0 
Nicaragua  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 3.0  1.4 2.4  2.3 
Rest of Latin America  7.9  5.5  8.6  -2.1 26.3 1.5 28.7  -0.6 
EEurope & Central Asia  -5.2  4.4  -6.2  4.4 -4.4 0.3 -5.2  0.3 
Baltic States  -0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.2 -7.5 0.3 -8.9  0.5 
Bulgaria  0.3 -0.1  0.4  0.1 5.1  -0.4 5.6  0.3 
Czech Republic  -0.7  0.4  -0.7  -0.3 -19.2  0.4 -20.9  -0.3 
Hungary  -0.7  0.3  -0.7  -0.1 -16.8  0.4 -17.9  -0.1 
Poland  -2.4  2.1  -2.5  1.7 -21.8  1.1 -22.6  0.9 
Romania  -0.3  0.2  -0.5  0.3 -3.7 0.4 -5.8  0.5 Slovakia  -0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.1 -11.8  0.2 -13.5  0.4 
Slovenia  0.0 0.1 0.0  0.1  -9.2  0.4  -11.1 0.4 
Russia  -2.2  -0.7  -2.3  -1.3 -6.3  -0.2 -6.6  -0.3 
Kazakhstan  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.5 23.1 1.1 23.0  1.2 
Turkey  -1.0  0.9  -1.5  0.9 -3.2 0.4 -4.7  0.4 
Rest of EEurope & Central 
Asia  1.5  0.5  1.5  2.1 11.1 0.4 11.1  1.8 
High-income countries  -55.1  61.9  -58.5  28.6 -13.8  0.2 -14.7  0.1 
Australia  2.2  8.4  2.7  11.7 10.9 1.5 13.7  2.1 
Canada  0.4  2.5  0.7  -4.6 3.4  0.3 5.3 -0.5 
EU 15  -42.9  16.7  -47.4  -45.9 -23.0  0.2 -25.4  -0.4 
Japan  -7.6  4.5  -7.6  93.2 -16.7  0.1 -16.8  2.3 
New Zealand  2.7  4.1  2.7  4.4 57.7 5.0 57.2  5.4 
Rest of Western Europe  -3.6  6.5  -3.6  -8.4 -25.8  1.0 -25.8  -1.3 
United States  -6.4 18.6  -6.0  -25.2 -5.7 0.2 -5.3  -0.2 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.0  0.6  0.0  3.4 3.7  0.4 2.2  2.1 
Developing countries  42.7  79.5 44.4 145.6 5.4  1.0 5.6  1.9 
North Africa  -0.1  3.9  -0.3  1.8 -0.4 1.8 -1.1  0.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.2 1.2 -0.6  -2.0  0.3  0.3  -0.8 -0.5 
East Asia   6.8  17.7 12.6 102.8 2.6  0.6 4.7  3.5 
South Asia  -8.2  6.7 -10.7  -2.1 -5.1 1.1 -6.7  -0.3 
Latin America   40.0  42.2  40.7  34.6 36.3 2.8 37.0  2.3 
Middle East  9.2  3.3  8.9  6.1 26.3 0.5 25.4  0.9 
EEurope & Central Asia  -5.2  4.4  -6.2  4.4 -4.4 0.3 -5.2  0.3 
World total  -12.4  141.4 -14.2  174.2 -1.0 0.4 -1.2  0.5 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations. 
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Table 12: Poverty effects of full global liberalization of merchandise trade reform, by region, 2004 
 
(a) the benchmark 
 
   Benchmark Poverty  elasticities 
 $1/day  $2/day  $1/day  $2/day 




poor      
   (%)  million  (%)  million       
East Asia   9  169  37  684      
China  10 128  35 452 -1.9 -1.3 
Other East Asia   9  41  50  232  -3.7  -2.1 
South Asia  31  446  77  1116      
India  34 371  80 868 -1.1 -0.5 
Other  South  Asia  29 76 94  248  -2.5  -0.7 
East Europe & Central Asia  1  4  10  46  -1.7  -1.7 
Middle East & North Africa  1  4  20  59  -2.5  -2.3 
Sub Saharan Africa  41  298  72  522  -0.7  -0.5 
Latin America   9  47  22  121  -1.7  -1.1 
           
Developing country total  18  969  48  2548      
Developing excl China  21  841  52  2096      
   38
Table 12 (continued) 
(b) Assuming all get average income gain 
    $1/day  $2/day  Change in no. of poor 
 
Avg. income 




poor $1/day $2/day 
  (%)  (%) million  (%) million million million 
East Asia   1.1  9 166  36 675 -2.9 -8.9 
China  0.2  10 128  35 451 -0.6 -1.4 
Other East Asia   1.9  8 38 49  224  -2.3  -7.5 
South Asia  -0.1  31 446  77  1116  0.1  0.3 
India  -0.2  34 371  80 868  0.6  0.7 
Other South Asia  0.3  29 75 94  248  -0.5  -0.4 
East Europe & Central Asia  1.2  1 4  10  45  -0.1  -1.0 
Middle East & North Africa  0.7  1 4  19  58  -0.1  -1.0 
Sub Saharan Africa  0.0  41 298  72 522  0.0  0.0 
Latin America   1.0  9 46 22  119  -0.8  -1.3 
Developing country total  0.9  18 966  47  2536 -3.7  -12.0 
Developing excl China  1.1  21 838  51  2085 -3.1  -10.6 
(c)  Focus on gain in real earnings of unskilled workers 








poor $1/day $2/day 
  (%)  (%) million  (%) million million million 
East Asia   4.4  8 151  34 632 -17 -52 
China  2.1  9 123  34 440  -5 -12 
Other East Asia   8.1  6 29 42  192  -12  -40 
South Asia  -1.9  32 454  78  1124  8  8 
India  -3.8  36 386  82 883  15  15 
Other South Asia  4.0  26 68 92  241 -8 -7 
East Europe & Central Asia  4.5  1 4 9  43  -0  -4 
Middle East & North Africa  14.3  1 3  13  40  -2  -19 
Sub Saharan Africa  5.3  39 287  70 508 -11 -14 
Latin America   4.1  8 44 21  115 -3 -6 
Developing country total  5.9  18 944  46  2462 -26 -87 
Developing excl China  6.5  20 820  50  2022 -21 -74 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations.    
a Nominal unskilled wage deflated by the food and clothing CPI 